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In “Beat the (Backward) Clock,”1 we argued that John Williams and Neil 
Sinhababu’s Backward Clock Case fails to be a counterexample to Robert Nozick’s 
or Fred Dretske’s Theories of Knowledge.2 Williams’ reply to our paper, “There’s 
Nothing to Beat a Backward Clock: A Rejoinder to Adams, Barker and Clarke,”3 is 
a further attempt to defend their counterexample against a range of objections. In 
this paper, we argue that, despite the number and length of footnotes, Williams is 
still wrong. As Shakespeare might have opined: “The Man doth protest too much, 
methinks!” Tracking theories still beat the clock! 
The central issue at the heart of our disagreement with Williams and 
Sinhababu is the role that methods (Nozick) or reasons (Dretske) play in these 
accounts of knowledge. Tracking the truth crucially depends on the method or 
reasons employed in the acquisition of belief. So central are such methods or 
reasons that it makes little sense to talk about beliefs being sensitive or adherent to 
the truth except in the context of the method or reasons employed to arrive at 
such beliefs. It is Williams and Sinhababu’s failure to accord method or reasons 
                                                                
1 Fred Adams, John A. Barker, and Murray Clarke, “Beat the (Backward) Clock,” Logos & 
Episteme VII, 3 (2016): 353-361. 
2 See John N.Williams and Neil Sinhababu, “The Backward Clock, Truth-Tracking, and Safety,” 
Journal of Philosophy 112, 1 (2015): 46-55. In this article they cite Adams and Clarke’s earlier 
defence of tracking theories in “Resurrecting the Tracking Theories,” Australasian Journal of 
Philosophy LXXXIII, 2, (2005): 207-221. 
3 John N. Williams, “There's Nothing to Beat a Backward Clock: A Rejoinder to Adams, Barker 
and Clarke,” Logos & Episteme VII, 3 (2016): 363-378. 
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their proper place in the respective accounts of knowledge that creates the illusion 
that the Backward Clock Case is a counterexample. It is no such thing. In what 
follows, we first revisit Nozick’s account of knowledge and the role that methods 
play in his account. Later, we show why Williams’ latest response fails to 
faithfully respect the tenets of Nozick’s view. Finally, we discuss Dretske’s appeal 
to reasons and explain how this appeal does the work that methods do for Nozick. 
The result is that Williams’ response also fails to address Dretske’s actual theory. 
1. Nozick’s Analysis of Knowledge 
In fact, there are three accounts of knowledge that Nozick provides: a simplified 
tracking account where he claims method need not be mentioned because it is not 
relevant for some straightforward cases, a methods account to deal with more 
complicated cases where single methods are at issue, and an outweighing account 
that involves two or more methods of arriving at belief. For our purposes, it is the 
second account that is needed to respond to Williams’ response to us. It states that: 
S knows, via method (or way of believing) M that p iff: 
1. p is true. 
2. S believes, via method or way of coming to believe M, that p. 
3. If p weren’t true and S were to use M to arrive at a belief whether (or 
not) p, then S wouldn’t believe, via M, that p. 
4. If p were true and S were to use M to arrive at a belief whether (or not) 
p, then S would believe, via M, that p.4  
Notice that the truth-tracking sensitivity and adherence conditions, i.e., 3 
and 4, both explicitly refer to the method. Here is what Nozick says about method:  
We need to relate this technical locution to our ordinary notion of knowledge. If 
only one method M is actually or subjunctively relevant to S’s belief that p, then, 
simply S knows that p (according to our ordinary notion) if and only if that 
method M is such that S knows that p via M. Some situations involve multiple 
methods, however…5  
Nozick goes on to discuss the Father/Son Court Case in order to introduce 
the third, outweighing, account of knowledge where multiple methods are at play. 
We now turn to Williams’ putative counterexample to Nozick’s account of 
knowledge. 
 
                                                                
4 Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), 176. 
5 Nozick, Philosophical Explanations, 176. 
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2. Williams’ Response to Our Response to Backward Clock 
Williams and Sinhababu describe The Backward Clock Case as follows: 
You habitually nap between 4 p.m. and 5 p.m. Your method of ascertaining the 
time you wake is to look at your clock, one you know has always worked 
perfectly reliably. Unbeknownst to you, your clock is a special model designed 
by a cult that regards the hour starting from 4 p.m. today as cursed, and wants 
clocks not to run forwards during that hour. So your clock is designed to run 
perfectly reliably backwards during that hour. At 4 p.m. the hands of the clock 
jumped to 5 p.m., and it has been running reliably backwards since then. This 
clock is analogue so its hands sweep its face continuously, but it has no second 
hand so you cannot tell that it is running backward from a quick glance. 
Awaking, you look at the clock at exactly 4:30 p.m. and observe that its hands 
point to 4:30 p.m. Accordingly, you form the belief that it is 4:30 p.m.6  
They argue that all of Nozick’s conditions are satisfied concerning this 
example but that it fails to be a case of knowledge, thus demonstrating that 
Nozick’s conditions are too weak for knowledge. In particular, if the time were 
not 4:30 p.m. (not p) then you would not believe that it was because, for instance, 
at 4:31 p.m. you would believe that it is 4:29 p.m. and so forth. You would hold a 
false belief but you would succeed in not believing that it was 4:30 p.m. as 
required by Nozick’s account. Similarly, in other circumstances where it were 
4:30, (say, you were closer to the clock) you would believe that it is 4:30 p.m. 
Hence, the belief is both sensitive to, and adherent to, the truth value of p, i.e., 
4:30 p.m., and so satisfies Nozick’s truth-tracking conditions, 3 and 4. Now 
Williams is correct to contend that we have challenged the claim by Williams and 
Sinhababu that Nozick’s third condition is satisfied in the Backward Clock Case. 
We certainly do deny that Nozick’s third condition is satisfied here. Why? This is 
because we think that the method, i.e., ‘looking at the clock and determining what 
it says,’7 is too equivocal to yield knowledge. As we pointed out, on the most 
plausible interpretation of the example the clock was designed by the cult 
clockmakers to fool people during the cursed hour. In effect, the clock ‘lies’ by 
displaying, for instance, 4:35 when the time is 4:25 and vice-versa. But ‘Ted,’ as we 
called the clockmaker, wasn’t a perfect liar, for when the clock displays 4:30 it is 
saying that the time is 4:30. Given Ted’s deceitful intentions, the clock might have 
said the time was 4:30 even if it hadn’t been 4:30. For instance, as we suggested, 
Ted might have made the clock run slowly all during the cursed hour. Hence, 
condition 3 is not satisfied. 
                                                                
6 Williams and Sinhababu, “The Backward Clock,” p. 48. 
7 Adams et.al., “Beat the (Backward),” 355. 
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At all other times during the hour between four and five, however, the 
clock succeeds in lying successfully. Hence, for any time during the hour, the 
method of ‘reading what the clock displays’ will generate false beliefs. As such, the 
method employed will generate false beliefs and so your beliefs will be insensitive 
to the truth-value of p for all values of p other than 4:30. But we also think that 
Nozick’s fourth condition, the adherence condition, is not satisfied in the 
Backward Clock Case. It is true that we accept that the cognizer has a true belief at 
4:30 p.m. But the cognizer does not satisfy the adherence condition. Why? This is 
because satisfying the adherence condition requires something much stronger 
than mere true belief, it requires that if it were 4:30 (in other circumstances) then 
one would believe that it was 4:30 p.m. But this is exactly what is not the case 
with the Backward Clock. As we pointed out: “His belief is that it is 4:30, and it 
happens to be 4:30. But it is not the case that he believes it is 4:30 because it is 
4:30-his believing it to be 4:30 is not explained by the fact that it is 4:30.“8 The 
signal is too equivocal to be reliable in other circumstances since the clock might 
have been made not to read 4:30 even if it was 4:30 and so one would not believe 
that P though P is true. Suppose, for instance, the clock shuts off at 4:30 for one 
minute but otherwise reliably runs backwards from 5 until 4. You wake up, look 
up, see no time on display, and suspend judgement on the time for that minute. In 
such a possible world, P is true but you don’t believe that P and so condition 4 is 
not satisfied. We deny, therefore, that condition four is satisfied concerning the 
Backward Clock Case. 
That the method generates a true belief at 4:30 is a chronometric accident 
caused by the mistake that Ted made in the construction of the clock. Now it is 
here that Williams suggests that the method need not be reliable for all of these 
other times during the hour as long as the method works for 4:30 then conditions 
1-4 will be satisfied and Nozick’s account will incorrectly generate the result that 
one knows that p. Our mistake, on William’s view, is mistaking Nozick’s 
sensitivity condition as a constraint on METHOD rather than BELIEF. But it is 
Williams who misunderstands Nozick’s theory, not us. This is because it is exactly 
the method that ensures that the correct connection between belief and fact 
obtains when we know some factual belief, that the belief is both sensitive and 
adherent. That method must be absolutely reliable with respect to a variety of 
input beliefs in near possible worlds for S to know that p. It cannot be reliable for 
just one belief in near possible worlds, such an equivocal method would fail to 
deliver the epistemic goods. Consider Nozick’s Grandmother Case: she believes 
that her Grandson is well by appeal to visual perception, but if he were sick then 
                                                                
8 Adams et.al., “Beat the (Backward),” 359. 
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her daughter would tell her that he is well anyway. But Nozick tells us that that 
alternative method, i.e., testimony, should not be allowed to undermine the 
knowledge caused by the method of visual perception that the Grandmother has. 
It is exactly because the Grandmother’s method, i.e., visual perception, is 
absolutely reliable for close distances to her in near possible worlds, that she can 
confidently say that her Grandson is well. Nozick was not just saying that this 
belief was true in the actual world but subjunctively true as well. That subjunctive 
truth implicitly refers to what the Grandmother would have believed about p, for 
all p, that are cases of visual perception under such circumstances for that 
Grandmother. What provides the basis for the tracking of truth in near possible 
worlds for that belief, i.e., p, is exactly the fact that that method would track the 
truth for any visual perceptual belief for the Grandmother under those 
circumstances in near possible worlds. To think otherwise, is to deny the fact that 
we are talking about tracking accounts of knowledge at all!  
Here is what Nozick says about the Grandmother Case: 
Recall the grandmother who sees her grandson visit her and so believes he is 
healthy and ambulatory; yet if he weren’t ambulatory, other relatives would tell 
her he was fine to spare her anxiety and upset. She sees her grandson walking; 
does she know he is ambulatory? According to condition 3 we must ask what she 
would believe if he weren’t ambulatory. If the method via which she believes is 
not held fixed, the answer will be wrong. True, if he weren’t ambulatory, she 
would then believe he was (via hearing about him from other relatives). But the 
relevant question is: what would she believe if he weren’t ambulatory and (as 
before) she saw him and spoke to him. Thus, to reach the correct answer about 
her knowledge, the method must be held fixed-that is one of the reasons why we 
introduced explicit reference to the method or way of believing.9  
Nozick makes it explicit that the Grandmother would generate other beliefs 
about her Grandson that are veridical in near possible worlds. The whole 
mechanism of possible worlds is simply a device to talk about other beliefs of the 
same kind, i.e., visual perception beliefs, and insist that the method must be held 
fixed: all visual perception beliefs, all beliefs of that type about her Grandson, 
must be reliably produced by that method for the Grandmother under those 
circumstances in order for her to know that p. That is what is meant by saying 
that a belief is not only true, but subjunctively true: one would have arrived at 
other related visual perception beliefs veridically in near possible worlds, one 
would have gotten things right in near possible worlds. Hence, the idea that one 
must track the truth of ‘not p’ veridically demonstrates that the method must be 
                                                                
9 Nozick, Philosophical Explanations, 216. 
Murray Clarke, Fred Adams, and John A. Barker  
104 
absolutely reliable for beliefs of that type. After all, the very idea of ‘not p’ 
includes, among other things, the entire universe of visual perception beliefs other 
than p! When Nozick asserts condition three his point is that, given your method, 
you would track the truth of ‘not p’ veridically, whether the resulting belief be q, 
r, or s. Hence, the Grandmother might form a different belief about her Grandson, 
such as q: “My Grandson is ill as evidenced by the fact that he cannot walk.” One 
must not believe that p and veridically track the truth such that you don’t believe 
that, say, q falsely. ‘Not p’ is a label for a universe of possible beliefs that one 
would reliably get correct in near possible worlds. That is what provides the 
subjunctive strengthening of the causal condition that Nozick felt was needed. He, 
like Dretske, felt that the causal condition was correct as far as it went, it just did 
not go far enough. The subjunctive allowed them to talk not just about getting the 
particular causal connection between belief and a fact right in the actual world, 
but getting the belief/fact connection right in near possible worlds as well. It 
strains credulity beyond the stratosphere to think that Nozick intended ‘not p’ to 
include the idea that one might latch on to ‘not p’ beliefs that were false and still 
be using a reliable method. Tracking the truth presupposes the reliability of the 
method for producing truth. Reading his account in any other way is simply a 
misreading of Nozick. The sensitivity condition, condition three, builds into it the 
idea of an absolutely reliable method, in near possible worlds but not all possible 
worlds, for tracking the truth of ‘not p.’ The reliability of the method concerning 
p is substantiated by the fact that that method would be reliable, in near possible 
worlds, for generating true beliefs. This is the correct understanding of what 
Nozick was arguing for. The Backward Clock Case would have led to a quick 
death for Nozick’s theory within minutes of his thinking of the theory if he had 
understood his own theory as Williams does. Why? Because Nozick himself would 
have understood that the theory, understood in that way, was bankrupt! But, says 
Williams, mightn’t Nozick not have noticed that the theory has this very odd 
consequence that even false ‘not p’ beliefs can serve to confirm condition three of 
the theory for a particular p? The correct answer to this objection is: No, only an 
extremely uncharitable reading of the theory could possibly interpret Nozick as 
intending, or leaving open, or suggesting, or not noticing, this interpretation of 
the theory. The principle of charity counsels us to avoid implausible and unlikely 
interpretations of the words of an author. If ever there was an implausible and 
unlikely reading of a theory, Williams’ reading of Nozick is it. There is no possible 
world where this reading of Nozick passes muster! 
The ‘Boy who cried Wolf’ Case, which we developed at length in our reply, 
was expressly devised to make the point that equivocal signals will not generate 
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knowledge. Conveniently, Williams ignores this argument from our response. As 
we noted:  
For any time other than exactly 4:30, the subject’s belief during that hour-long 
period will be false. Why? Because the clock lies for all but one moment during 
that hour-long period. And worst of all, there is nothing in the signal sent by the 
clock to differentiate when it is telling the false time from when it is telling a 
true time. 
This should remind one of the “little boy who cried ‘wolf.’” The boy cries ‘wolf’ 
over and over when there is no wolf. Then on the one occasion when there is a 
wolf and he cries ‘wolf,’ his cry has become to equivocal, no one can tell from his 
cry that a wolf is actually there on that one occasion. His cry of ‘wolf’ still means 
wolf, but it does not carry the information that there is a wolf. Similarly, the 
clock’s face emits false testimony for 59 minutes during that hour from 4:00 to 
5:00.10   
The appeal to Shannon’s information theory in Knowledge and the Flow of 
Information was the way that Dretske chose to instantiate the subjunctive 
condition that he imposed from his early Conclusive Reasons Account of 
knowledge. The role that Dretske’s subjunctive conditional played in his 
Conclusive Reasons Account of knowledge, i.e., Given R and fixed circumstances 
C, it is not physically possible that not p, in turn, was taken over by Nozick’s third 
condition on knowledge. Nozick’s subjunctive conditional is not identical to 
Dretske’s subjunctive conditional but it imposes a similar constraint on 
knowledge.11 At any rate, our appeal to information in this example was intended 
to draw out the problem in Williams’ Backward Clock Case by appealing to a 
Dretskean notion of information via the Boy Who Cried Wolf Case. The upshot is 
that neither the interpreter of the Boy who cried Wolf nor the ordinary person 
who sees the Backward Clock displaying 4:30 is in a position to know anything 
about the wolf, or the time, in such cases.  
Williams also mentions that: “Nozick introduces methods into his analysis, 
not as a way of elucidating sensitivity, but in order to avoid a counterexample.”12 
While this is one reason to introduce methods, it is hardly Nozick’s only reason to 
do so. As we mentioned in an earlier paper,13 how could condition (4) be satisfied 
by anyone, if methods aren’t the means? Truths don’t just pop into heads. It often 
                                                                
10 Adams et.al., “Beat the (Backward),” 358. 
11 Nozick, in speaking of Dretske’s condition two, says that: “While this condition corresponds 
to our condition 3, he has nothing corresponding to 4.” (Nozick, Philosophical Explanations, 
689, footnote 53.) 
12 Williams, “There’s Nothing,” 364. 
13 Adams and Clarke, “Resurrecting,” 214. 
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takes hard work (science, detectives) to discover them. We take it as an obvious 
fact about tracking theories (Nozick’s or Dretske’s) that beliefs only track in virtue 
of reasons or methods. Otherwise, such theories would make no sense. In fact, we 
were able to show that that many apparent counterexamples to Tracking Theories 
founder by overlooking this important feature of such theories (as made explicit 
by Dretske14 and Nozick.15 So it is a significant error to take Nozick’s account of 
tracking to be only about beliefs and not about how one arrives at those beliefs. By 
proudly announcing his intention to focus only upon beliefs, Williams guarantees 
non-success at responding to our reply to his Backward Clock Case. In this 
context, Williams’ claim that we are defending a different theory than Nozick’s 
because we talk about METHOD fails. Rather, if one overlooks the crucial role 
that METHODS play in Nozick’s account of knowledge (or REASONS in Dretske’s 
account of knowledge) then one really just does not understand Nozick, Dretske 
or Tracking Theories. We suspect, in Williams’ case, it is all three. This brings us 
to Dretske’s Conclusive Reasons Account of Knowledge. 
3. Dretske’s Conclusive Reasons Account of Knowledge 
Dretske’s early Conclusive Reasons Account of Knowledge is, for many of us, his 
definitive account of knowledge. The account of knowledge contained in his book, 
Knowledge and the Flow of Information, provides a cognitive science, 
information-theoretic gloss that essentially reproduces the conclusive reasons 
story about knowledge. Without pretending to defend that claim, let’s rehearse 
the account of knowledge contained in Dretske’s Ur-text, “i.e., Conclusive 
Reasons.” As Dretske states it: 
S knows that p just in case 
(1) S believes that p (without doubt, reservation or question) on the basis 
of R. 
(2) R would not be the case unless p were the case. 
(3) Either S knows that R, or R is some experiential state of S.16  
The subjunctive condition, 2, is to be read as saying that: Given R (your 
reasons or evidence), and fixed circumstances C (all those conditions that are 
logically and causally independent of the fact that p), then it is not physically 
possible that not p. Williams makes his first mistake here by construing Dretske’s 
notion of a reason as referring only to a premise in an argument from an 
                                                                
14 Fred Dretske, “Conclusive Reasons,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 49, I (1971): 1-22. 
15 Nozick, Philosophical Explanations. 
16 Dretske, “Conclusive Reasons,” 12-13. 
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internalist perspective. Dretske does not restrict the idea of a reason in that way, 
but includes one’s evidence, i.e., facts one knows to obtain, even if one is not 
aware of what one’s evidence is. Dretske is, after all, an externalist about 
knowledge. Referring to Dretske’s account here, Williams misunderstands Dretske 
in claiming that: “Here R is a reason that S has for believing that p. We nowhere 
talked of a reason.”17 At any rate, Williams goes on to argue that Dretske’s 
sensitivity condition is satisfied because of the conjunctive reason that the  
…hands point to 4:30 p.m. and your clock has always worked perfectly reliably. 
But this conjunction would not be true unless it were 4:30 p.m., because the 
hands would not point to 4:30 unless it were 4:30 p.m. This is because the 
circumstances in which you find yourself include those in which the clock runs 
perfectly reliably backwards from 5:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. Finally, we may 
stipulate that you know the conjunction that the hands point to 4:30 p.m. and 
your clock has always worked perfectly reliably. (1) to (3) are all true, but you do 
not know that it is 4:30 p.m. any more than you know this in Stopped Clock. So 
Dretske’s early analysis is also too weak, predicting knowledge where there is 
ignorance.18  
In this case, the key question for Dretske would be whether given your 
reasons or evidence R, and fixed circumstances C, it is physically possible that not 
p. That is, given that the clock displays 4:30 p.m. and has always been reliable, and 
the fixed circumstances surrounding the production of that clock, is it physically 
possible that it is not 4:30 p.m.? It is important to note here that Dretske intends 
the notion of what is physically possible to be constrained by natural law and the 
circumstances at hand. That is, could that clock have read 4:30 when it was not 
4:30 p.m.? As we pointed out in our reply to Williams, the answer to this question 
for Dretske is “Yes, it is physically possible that the clock could have read 4:30 
when it was not 4:30 p.m. at all.” As we noted: “The clock in the Normal Clock 
case wouldn’t have said that the time was 4:30 by displaying “4:30” if it hadn’t 
been 4:30. Ted’s clock, however, might have done this even if it hadn’t be 4:30.”19 
The cult might have devised the clock to read 4:30 when it was not 4:30 p.m. by 
making it run perfectly well backwards but more slowly such that it never 
recorded the correct time at any moment during that hour.20 Hence, Dretske’s 
sensitivity condition is not satisfied. You can learn things from people, Dretske 
said, but only from people who would not say something unless it were true. 
Applied to our case, this suggests that the cult clock-makers cannot be trusted 
                                                                
17 Williams, “There’s Nothing,” 374. 
18 Williams, “There’s Nothing,” 375. 
19 Adams et.al., “Beat the (Backward),” 358. 
20 Adams et.al., “Beat the (Backward),” 357-358. 
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because they made a clock that, in effect, lies for 59 of 60 minutes from 4:00 p.m. 
until 5:00 p.m. Anyone that makes a clock like that cannot be trusted, they might 
easily have made other deceptive clocks that would lie in all sorts of physically 
possible ways. But Williams responds to the suggestion that the cult clock makers 
might have made a clock that was slower by countering the final claim about Ted 
by us, saying:  
This last claim is false. We stipulated that in the actual world, the clock runs 
perfectly reliably backwards from 5:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. So the only time at 
which its hands can point to 4:30 p.m. is when it is 4:30 p.m. Adams et.al.21 point 
out that the cult could design the clock so its hands wouldn’t point to the correct 
time at any time during the hour that you nap (say by making it run backward 
more slowly). Perhaps they had that possibility in mind. But as we described 
Backward Clock, worlds close to the actual circumstances in which you look at it 
cannot include those in which its mechanism differs from that which makes it 
run perfectly reliably backwards from 5 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. As we said, this is 
because the truth-adherence of your belief that it is 4:30 in Normal Clock resides 
in the fact that you would still have that belief in slightly changed circumstances 
in which the mechanism of the clock continues to work perfectly reliably. 
Likewise, the worlds close to the actual circumstances of Stopped Clock surely 
include those in which the mechanism of the clock is stopped. 
What is essential to our counterexample then, is that the behaviour of its 
mechanism gets fixed across close possible worlds. Anything else, including the 
intentions of its designers, is simply irrelevant. In fact we introduced the story of 
the cult into the example to ensure that the behaviour of its mechanism gets 
fixed across close possible worlds, but other stories could be told. Perhaps the 
cult intended to symbolize the cursed nature of the hour with a seemingly 
unnatural phenomenon. Indeed we could dispense with the cult entirely and 
stipulate that a bug in the programming of the microchip circuit of your clock 
causes it to run perfectly reliably backwards from 5:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. during a 
particular hour.22  
What is crucial then, for Williams, is that the mechanism of the clock is 
held fixed across close possible worlds when considering subjunctive conditionals 
of the sort that Nozick imposes on knowledge. Unfortunately for Williams and 
Sinhababu, what needs to be held fixed across possible worlds is not mechanisms 
but the method M for Nozick, or, for Dretske, the circumstances C relative to the 
reasons or evidence R. Methods are determined to be methods from the inside for 
Nozick. As he notes:  
                                                                
21 Adams et.al., “Beat the (Backward).” 
22 Williams, “There’s Nothing,” 372. 
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A person can use a method (in my sense) without proceeding methodically, and 
without knowledge or awareness of what method he is using. Usually, a method 
will have a final upshot in experience on which the belief is based, such as visual 
experience, and then (a) no method without this upshot is the same method, and 
(b) any method experientially the same, the same ‘from the inside,’ will count as 
the same method. Basing our beliefs on experiences, you and I and the person 
floating in the tank are using, for these purposes, the same method.23  
So, for instance, the Grandmother uses the method of visual perception in 
arriving at beliefs in the actual world and it is this method that must be held fixed 
in near possible worlds when considering whether the Grandmother knows that 
her Grandson is well in the actual world. Nowhere does Nozick claim that all 
circumstances must be held fixed, including circumstances that are logically and 
causally dependent on the fact expressed by p. Dretske, in fact, is explicit about 
this. The circumstances, C, that are held fixed when considering subjunctive 
conditionals relating R and p like his (2) are all those circumstances that are 
logically and causally independent of the state of affairs expressed by p.24 As 
Dretske notes: “But does C include all the circumstances that prevail on the 
occasion in question or only some of these? Clearly not all the circumstances since 
this would trivialize every subjunctive conditional of this sort.”25 Dretske’s idea 
here is that it cannot be the case that all circumstances are held fixed or all 
subjunctive conditionals would be trivially true. But that is not the case. 
In the case of the Backward Clock, then, one cannot hold the mechanism of 
the clock fixed in near possible worlds because that circumstance is something 
that is dependent on the fact that p: that it is 4:30 p.m. That is, there is a 
dependency relationship between the fact that it is 4:30 p.m. and that the 
mechanism works the way that it does. Change the mechanism, and you change 
the time. We need to ask, therefore, “If it were not the case that the time was 4:30 
is it physically possible that you would believe that it was 4:30 p.m. anyway?” The 
answer is Yes, the cult might have made the clock display 4:30 p.m. when it was 
not 4:30 p.m. because they might have made it lie in another way. If they can 
make it lie one way, then there are many ways that they can make the clock lie. If 
there is one way, then there are many ways. The point is that the clockmakers 
made the mechanism causally dependent on the time. The clock flips to 5:00 p.m. 
at 4:00 p.m. Hence, the clock’s mechanism is causally dependent on p: “It is 4:30 
p.m.” As such, the clock’s mechanism must be allowed to vary. You cannot hold 
the mechanism fixed as Williams and Sinhababu wish to do, and must insist on, to 
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make their purported counterexample work, because it is causally dependent on 
the fact that the time was manipulated at 4:00 p.m. That mechanism must be 
allowed to vary or the relevant counterfactual conditional, i.e., The clock would 
not have read 4:30 p.m. unless it were 4:30 p.m., would be trivialized. As Dretske 
says concerning defective thermometers, in a parallel case, you cannot trust 
defective thermometers: “If it is that kind of thermometer, then if S’s only basis 
for thinking his child’s temperature normal is a 98.6 reading on it, then he does 
not know that his child’s temperature is normal. It might be normal, of course, but 
if S knows that it is, he must have more to go on than the reading on this 
(defective) thermometer.”26 Likewise, you cannot trust defective clocks. If 
Williams and Sinhababu could insist on holding the mechanism fixed then they 
could have made their case. However, Dretske is explicit that this is not possible 
and Nozick’s sensitivity condition imposes the same constraint here as Dretske’s 
does: to allow the mechanism to be fixed across near possible worlds would be to 
trivialize Nozick’s sensitivity condition, a condition that is equivalent to Dretske’s 
sensitivity condition.  
Another important point about method comes out in the claim, from the 
long quote from Williams a few pages back, that Williams and Sinhababu could 
have dispensed with talk of the cult entirely and just had a bug in the microchip of 
the circuit of your clock cause the clock to run perfectly reliably backwards from 
5:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. Call this the ‘Buggy Clock Case.’ This buggy clock is no 
longer properly calibrated once the bug kicks in, and it becomes a ‘broken’ or 
‘improperly functioning’ clock analogous to a stopped clock, analogous to a clock 
that happens to stop at noon one day and happens to restart at noon the next day, 
etc. The design aspect of such clocks is no longer operative, and therefore they 
don’t really SAY anything about the time, even though they continue to DISPLAY 
the time and appear to SAY something about it. We want here to underline a 
crucial point about the nature of method or reasons for Nozick and Dretske. There 
is a world of difference between what a clock DISPLAYS and what it SAYS. The 
first is a pre-reflective matter, the second involves interpretation and method. The 
design aspect of clocks only becomes clear if they function in the way that they 
are supposed to, only if what they SAY accords with their design. Moreover, in 
fact, sometimes people have to learn to ‘read’ a clock, i.e., learn to interpret what 
the display says. Instructions from the designer (or manufacturer) will accompany 
a watch in such cases. In this respect, what Williams has to say about method is 
out of step with what externalists like Nozick and Dretske intend. Williams is not 
sensitive to the distinction between what the clock DISPLAYS, i.e., the position of 
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its hands, and what the clock SAYS, i.e., what it designedly indicates about the 
current time, and how that distinction functions in Nozick’s account of method 
and Dretske’s account of reasons (in his broad notion of reason as including 
evidence). In fact, Williams evidently did not understand how we were using the 
term ‘SAY’ in our reply to him. The result is not only a misunderstanding of our 
view, but of Nozick’s view and Dretske’s view. It should also be noted that 
Williams talks about your knowing that the clock has always been reliable in the 
Backward Clock case, but that is the kind of internalist talk that externalists 
eschew. The possession of reasons or evidence, for Nozick and Dretske, does not 
require any sort of internal awareness or recognition in the epistemic internalist 
sense. One’s having reasons or evidence is crucial to knowing but may involve no 
occurrent thought or access to a thought about the method at all. As Nozick says: 
“A person can use a method (in my sense) without proceeding methodically, and 
without knowledge or awareness of what method he is using.”27 All of this is 
compatible with the idea that what ultimately counts as the method is experiential 
states that are internal to the cognizer. In Nozick’s sense of method: You and I, 
and a person floating in a tank on Alpha Centauri might be using the same method 
because methods are individuated from the standpoint of the cognizer. The 
cognizer, however, need not have any grasp of what that method is. 
4. Closing Remarks 
The upshot of this is that Williams and Sinhababu have misread both Nozick and 
Dretske, since what is held fixed when considering Nozick’s conditions 3 and 4 or 
Dretske’s 2 is not mechanisms but the method M or reasons R in relation to p 
(such as that the Grandmother used the method of visual perception when 
determining the health condition of her Grandson or the person waking up and 
using visual perception to determine the time). Facts that are logically or causally 
independent of p are, however, held fixed. Put otherwise, facts that are dependent 
on p are allowed to vary. The mechanism of the clock is, therefore, dependent on 
the fact that p, and so that how that mechanism works must be allowed to vary or 
we would trivialize subjunctives regarding it. By holding the mechanism of the 
clock fixed in near possible worlds, Williams and Sinhababu have only succeeded 
in trivializing what are actually the profound implications of the employment of 
subjunctive conditionals in the articulation of two truth-tracking accounts of 
knowledge. Only by distorting the fundamental nature of Dretske’s and Nozick’s 
accounts of knowledge have Williams and Sinhababu provided the appearance of a 
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counterexample to truth-tracking accounts of knowledge. Hence, Williams cannot 
insist that the mechanism of the clock be held fixed in near possible worlds. We 
need to consider alternative near possible worlds where that mechanism is, for 
instance, simply slowed down and where we always get the time wrong to see that 
the observer could believe that it is 4:30 in such a world and be mistaken because 
all of the times are wrong. Such mechanisms, such signals, are much too equivocal 
to deliver knowledge in accordance with Nozick’s or Dretske’s accounts of 
knowledge. As such, they fail to track the truth in nearby possible worlds as 
promised. Dretske and Nozick tie beliefs via the Method M or Reasons R to facts. 
Those methods M or reasons R must be sensitive for both Dretske and Nozick and 
additionally adherent for Nozick in order to track the truth. The method M or 
Reasons R are held fixed but the circumstances that are logically and causally 
independent of the fact expressed by p are not held fixed on either account. This is 
the case because Dretske and Nozick wish to avoid the trivialization of the 
sensitivity subjunctive conditionals that they employ. The upshot is that Williams 
and Sinhababu have failed to advance a genuine counterexample to tracking-
theories of knowledge. 
